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Philosophy and Other Essays, by F. 
Copleston 
 
 
 
Michael G. Vater 
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University 
Milwaukee, WI 
 
 
 
On the History of Philosophy and Other Essays. Copleston, F. Totowa, N.J.: 
Barnes and Noble, 1979. 160 pp. $15.00 
 
This is a collection of eight essays by the famed historian of 
philosophy, six of them previously unpublished. The first two concern 
the practice of the philosophical historian; the rest loosely group about 
the theme of the validity of metaphysics. I shall first comment on the 
most interesting of the second group. "Ethics and Metaphysics: East 
and West" explores the limits of comparative generalizations about 
Eastern and Western philosophy. When suitably qualified, statements 
such as "Eastern philosophy tends to be metaphysically monistic, and 
thus ethically relativistic" and "Western thought stands fast on the 
concept of the individual and his value" convey reliable information. 
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Copleston believes Eastern thought poses a challenge to Western 
societies, for its moral vision remains embedded in a metaphysical and 
religious view of man, while the West has put its concept of the value 
of the human person in jeopardy in effecting the divorce of fact and 
value.  
In "Some Aspects of Medieval Philosophy" Copleston argues that 
philosophy had considerably more independence in the Middle Ages 
than the "handmaid of theology" cliche suggests. While the 
demonstrability of "sacred doctrine" was always in question, 
philosophy pursued its interest in formal logic unhindered. And if this 
predominant interest in logic be viewed as the connecting thread of 
the whole period, the so-called decline into fideism signaled by 
thinkers such as Scotus and Ockham can be seen not as a loss of 
speculative courage, but as the result of a heightened awareness of 
the need for rigor in "proofs" and a more critical approach to 
epistemology than the 13th Century evidenced. Copleston's simple 
point: Aquinas was not the whole of the Middle Ages.  
In "The Nature of Metaphysics" Copleston claims that the 
"craving for generality" which makes metaphysics problematic to some 
of his contemporaries is but the tendency toward conceptual 
unification common to all forms of theoretical understanding. 
Distinguishing between descriptive metaphysics and what he calls 
"explanatory metaphysics," he notes the former is hardly 
controversial, while the latter is almost necessarily disputable, for the 
metaphysical mind moves from the general supposition of the 
intelligibility of reality up to some Absolute or unconditioned One as a 
necessary presupposition. Copleston candidly acknowledges the 
religious significance of such an idea for him, but notes that 
metaphysics will probably never be placed beyond dispute.  
One would expect the two essays on the history of philosophy to 
be the most interesting in the volume, but the reader who looks for a 
profound theoretical discussion will be disappointed. For one who has 
done the whole history of philosophy, questions about method seem 
academic and tend to be answered by "I did it this way" or "common 
sense." The first essay raises a host of questions: What is to count as 
philosophy for the historian? Is argumentation the criterion for 
distinguishing philosophy from religion? Should a history trace 
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systematic issues or treat individual "great" philosophers? What about 
biography and psychobiography? Should the historian merely recount 
past philosophies or is his task to judge their truth or falsity? Should a 
philosophy be explained as a product of its culture? Copleston finds 
himself unable to articulate general criteria for solving these problems; 
time and again, he retreats to "common sense" and personal 
preference. Evidently the accomplished historian possesses prudence 
to a surpassing degree.  
A separate essay is dedicated to the problem of a history's 
objectivity. Here the objectors are the ones in possession of criteria, 
skeptics (straw men, really) who claim we are unable to separate fact 
and fiction, who demand an absolute distinction of "data" and 
"interpretation," or who demand the impossible, viz., the exclusion of 
the logical possibility of error. Against such extravagant opponents it is 
indeed easy to answer that data and interpretation somehow meet and 
illuminate one another in the act of reading, that texts limit the 
historian's reconstruction, and that, though error cannot be excluded, 
all historical statements are revisable. One feels that Copleston's 
answers are unsatisfactory, not wrong, but certainly not justified and 
fully explained. For, unlike a Gadamer or a Roland Barthes, Copleston 
fails to explore the "how" and the "why" of his "common sense," of his 
objectivity, and to attend profoundly to what happens when he reads 
an ancient text. 
 
